MARKETPLACE THEORY
IN THE AGE OF AI COMMUNICATORS
Jared Schroeder
INTRODUCTION
The growing presence of artificially intelligent
communicators as actors among self-governing citizens,
particularly since the 2016 presidential election in the United
States, has raised substantial concerns regarding the theoretical
assumptions that have traditionally undergirded the marketplace
of ideas conceptualization of the First Amendment. These
concerns do not so much arise from the longstanding fear of deus
ex machina—that we would create a “god from the machine”—
but rather de mundi machina, which means to create “a world
from the machine.”1 In other words, artificially intelligent (“AI”)
entities bring with them the potential to substantially influence
the world that humans create via the information and ideas each
person encounters.
For this reason, AI communicators create concern
because they increasingly influence the types and frequencies of
ideas that individuals do and do not encounter within their
virtual communities. These personal, self-selected online
communities are characterized by individual decisions that
citizens make regarding the types of information they wish to
encounter. 2 When AI actors become both the originators and
carriers of massive amounts of information with individuals’
generally homogenous personal networks, the foundational
theoretical framework of the marketplace of ideas theory—the
Supreme Court’s most popular and longest-enduring tool for
communicating how it understands freedom of expression—is
threatened. The theory’s assumptions about the nature of truth,
the nature of the human actors who take part in communicating
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ideas, and the flow of information has been undermined; massive
numbers of AI communicators are incompatible with the First
Amendment’s marketplace of ideas.3
AI communicators are incompatible with self-governing
citizens in the marketplace of ideas because they do not sleep,
have families, vote, or become emotional. They also do not have
any concern for their mortality or for a system of ethics.4 These
communicators are, by their natures, an entirely new type of
actor within the spaces philosophers and legal scholars have long
conceptualized as a marketplace of ideas.5 Within these spaces,
generally rational individuals who are for the most part free from
government limitations on expression are capable of discerning
truthful or correct ideas from false or wrong ones. Such an
assumption was at the heart of English author and philosopher
John Milton’s contention in Areopagitica that, “[w]here there is
much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing,
much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but
knowledge in the making.” 6 Quite similarly, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, in introducing the marketplace metaphor into
the United States’ legal vocabulary in 1919, concluded that “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution.” 7 As legal scholar Edwin Baker
explained, the theory assumes “people are basically rational.
People must possess the capacity correctly to perceive truth or
reality.” 8 Crucially, the theory, and the assumptions that
undergird it, was constructed based on assumptions about
human processes regarding understanding and self-government
that function substantially differently when AI communicators
are taking part in the discourse.
Concerns about the marketplace theory itself are not
9
new. The presence of AI entities, which represent only the
vanguard of what scholars expect is to come regarding AI

3
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Id. at 3–5; JEROME BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA xiii–xiv (1973); SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 16; Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 15–18 (1984).
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functionality in the near future, merely exacerbates longstanding
concerns regarding the assumptions of the theory. 10 Scholars
have long contended the theory’s conceptualization of the nature
of truth, which assumes it is objective and generally universal to
all, cannot be supported, and has long been disregarded.11 Others
have emphasized that assuming individuals are rational and
capable of making sense of the world around them fails to
account for the vast array of human experiences that lead people
to construct substantially different realities.12 People’s differing
socioeconomic statuses, individual experiences, and societal
roles can influence how individuals evaluate information. 13
Thus, though individuals may generally be rational, that
rationality will not always lead to the same conclusions about
what is true or right. Similarly, scholars have noted the
substantial differences in the availability of information for
different groups and the fact that some messengers have the
power to communicate ideas that others do not, meaning that
those who have the most resources—rather than those who
communicate the “truth”—often dominate the marketplace.14
Exacerbating these concerns, the emergence and
widespread adoption of networked technologies during the past
few decades have provided AI communicators with an ideal
environment in which to develop and interact with people in
ways that were not possible in the past. The existence of such
spaces has substantially shifted the nature of the marketplace
itself. As much of political discourse has moved from physical
forums to virtual ones, the way truth forms and the ways people
create communities have changed along with them.15 Freed from
the limitations of geographic boundaries when forming
communities, individuals are increasingly joining interest-based
collectives, which often, within the broader, fragmented, and
10
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choice-rich overall marketplace, act as smaller, somewhat
ideologically isolated community spaces. 16 These communities
have become, in many instances, walled gardens, which are
smaller and less diverse, but more comfortable spaces, in which
individuals are the primary architects. These environments are
substantially different than traditional, physical, and societally
constructed environments in which individuals have less control
over how they present themselves and are faced with greater
likelihood of social isolation if they act outside of expected or
perceived community norms and values.17
In other words, the choice-rich nature of online spaces
has made it so that the broader marketplace has been replaced by
fragmented, idea-based spaces where individuals often agree
upon different truths than those in other communities. Across the
Internet, for example, certain virtual communities have
concluded that former United States President Barack Obama
was born in Kenya and could not have legally been president.18
People in other communities have come to quite the opposite
truth, finding the birther movement to be a disproven conspiracy
theory. 19 In this example, two versions of accepted realities
persist, despite being in direct opposition to one another.20 This
scenario is more possible and likely than it has been in the past
because of the fragmented, interest-based virtual communities in
which individuals communicate. Individuals, particularly in
such a choice-rich environment, are more likely to accept

16

MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 3–4 (2000) [hereinafter
CASTELLS, RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY]; SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 59–67; W.
Lance Bennett & Shanto Iyengar, A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing
Foundations of Political Communication, 58 J. COMM. 707, 720 (2008).
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Zizi Papacharissi, A Networked Self: Identity Performance and Sociability on Social
Network Sites, in FRONTIERS IN NEW MEDIA RESEARCH 207, 209 (Francis L.F. Lee et
al eds., 2013). See also Caroline Haythornthwaite, Strong, Weak, and Latent Ties and the
Impact of New Media, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 385, 386 (2002).
18
Birther Report (@BirtherReport), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/BirtherReport;
Dean Garrison, 2004 Flashback—Kenyan Newspaper Reported Barack Obama Born in
Kenya, FREEDOM OUTPOST (May 17, 2014), https://freedomoutpost.com/2004flashback-kenyan-newspaper-reported-barack-obama-born-kenya/; Paul J. Watson,
Evidence Obama Born in Kenya Goes Beyond 1991 Brochure, INFOWARS (May 18, 2012),
https://www.infowars.com/evidence-obama-born-in-kenya-goes-beyond-1991brochure/.
19
Barack Obama’s Birth Certificate Is a Forgery: False, SNOPES (Aug. 27, 2011),
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/birth-certificate/; J. Weston Phippen, The Last
of the Birthers, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/12/sheriff-joe-arpaio-thebirther/510857/; Eleanor Sheehan, Aging Bigot Still Clinging To Birther Beliefs,
SPLINTER (Nov. 28, 2017, 11:38 PM), https://splinternews.com/aging-bigot-stillclinging-to-birther-beliefs-1820823358.
20
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98–101.
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information that reinforces their preexisting understandings and
reject information that does not.21
Thus, the marketplace metaphor, the dominant
theoretical justification for freedom of expression protections in
a democratic society, faces new problems regarding longstanding
unresolved questions about its primary conceptual building
blocks as we enter the fourth wave of the Internet. This fourth
wave, Web 4.0, which has also been labeled the Symbiotic Web,
is characterized by increasingly meaningful interactions and
relationships between human and AI communicators.22
This Article consists of five parts: Part I begins by
examining the nature of these non-human communicators, as
well as the networked environments in which they are
flourishing. Part II examines how human discourse, in the form
of intentional communities and other concerns, is changing as a
result of networked communication. Part III examines the
fundamental assumptions, as well as the primary concerns, that
have historically surrounded the marketplace approach. Finally,
in the absence of any specifically AI-related legal precedents in
this regard, Part IV considers the conceptual rationales courts
have used, particularly in regard to corporate speech and animal
rights decisions, when deciding cases that involve non-human
actors who seek human-like rights. Ultimately, in light of each of
these considerations, Part V proposes a process-based approach
for how the marketplace theory can remain functional in the era
of AI communicators.
I. ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES AS ACTORS IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Although the Declaration of Independence promises that “all
men are created equal,” the same cannot be said for AI
communicators. 23 Thus, while these entities have played
substantial roles in the most recent major elections in the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom, and are playing an
increasing role in societal discourse, they cannot be understood
as a homogenous group. In particular, substantial differences
exist regarding whether AI entities are creating entirely new
content or merely sharing or otherwise distributing existing
messages. Similarly, these entities vary in their complexity, with
21

Bennett & Iyengar, supra note 16, at 724–26.
Younghee Noh, Imagining Library 4.0: Creating a Model for Future Libraries, 41 J.
ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 786, 789–90 (2015) (stating that Web 1.0 was characterized by
massive information searchability and availability; Web 2.0 added increased content
creation opportunities for citizen publishers, particularly via social media outlets;
Web 3.0, the current wave, built upon these advancements, allowing for simpler
connections between data and knowledge).
23
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
22
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some including only rudimentary capabilities and others
possessing human-like capabilities when it comes to
communication.24
A. From Parking Tickets to Tinder Talk
AI entities are created for a variety of purposes. Joshua
Browder created “the world’s first robot lawyer,” a computer
program that can help people get out of parking permits and
receive flight refunds.25 Other programmers create AI actors to
make money, such as those that sell followers for people’s
Twitter accounts or views on YouTube. 26 One of the largest
contingencies of AI communicators in virtual spaces, however,
are politics-related bots. These entities are created, at their most
benign, to inform and persuade people about certain political
beliefs and ideas. 27 At worst, however, they mislead and
misinform. 28 As bots have become easier to make, more and
more people are creating them and using them as tools to
communicate or spread ideas.29 Still, many of the political bots
are attributed to domestic and foreign political actors who create
and employ AI communicators to confuse or influence political
24

The Ephemerides, for example, creates original poetry using words found in
nineteenth-century books. The Ephemerides, TUMBLR, https://theephemerides.tumblr.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). Still more complex, picdescbot
draws images from Wikimedia Commons and seeks to describe what it sees.
Picdescbot, TUMBLR, https://picdescbot.tumblr.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). On
the more basic end, Emoji Aquarium tweets collections of marine-life-related emojis
every few hours. Emoji Aquarium (@EmojiAquarium), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/EmojiAquarium (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). It has almost
20,000 followers. Id.
25
DoNotPay (@DoNotPayLaw), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/DoNotPayLaw
(last visited Nov. 13, 2018); see also DoNotPay (2018), DoNotPay [Mobile
application software], https://itunes.apple.com/app/id1427999657.
26
Nicholas Confessore, Gabriel J.X. Dance, Richard Harris & Mark Hansen, The
Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-mediabots.html; Michael H. Keller, The Flourishing Business of Fake YouTube Views, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/11/technology/youtube-fake-viewsellers.html.
27
See Jacob Shamsian, There’s a Bot on Tinder Trying To Influence Votes in the British
Election, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 8, 2017, 2:59 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/united-kingdom-election-jeremy-corbyn-tinderbot-labour-2017-6?r=UK&IR=T; see also Sara A. O’Brien, Who’s Donating to Trump?
This Bot Will Tell You, CNN (June 22, 2016, 10:07 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/06/22/technology/every-trump-donorbot/index.html (during the 2016 presidential election, @EveryTrumpDonor, a
Twitter bot, pulled public campaign contribution information and posted one
campaign donor’s name every thirty minutes).
28
See Dave Lee, The Tactics of a Russian Troll Farm, BBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43093390.
29
Nick Bilton, Social Media Bots Offer Phony Friends and Real Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/fashion/social-media-bots-offerphony-friends-and-real-profit.html.
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discourse and remain relatively difficult to identify.30 About onequarter of all Tweets that were posted about the 2016 presidential
election in the United States were generated by non-human
account holders.31 Similarly, just before the French presidential
election in spring 2017, AI communicators posted thousands of
Twitter messages, most of which were linked to false
information. 32 A few months later, partisans in the United
Kingdom employed tens of thousands of bots on Tinder, the
dating and hook-up app, to encourage younger voters to support
Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour Party candidate.33 The Tinder bots
automatically “swiped right,” thus indicating an interest in a
match, on countless human users’ profiles. 34 If the user also
swiped right, the bot engaged them in a political, rather than
romantic, dialogue regarding the Labour Party’s policies. 35 In
one example, the bot messaged, “heyy [sic] lovely. You gonna
[sic] vote in the election? & for who?” and followed this with
“The vote is so close and under 25s [sic] could actually swing
it!!” 36 Importantly, as with many interactions with AI
communicators in networked spaces, the communicator
impersonated a human and did not disclose its non-human
nature.
AI communicators are doing more than working to
influence elections. They are also producing substantial amounts
of political rhetoric. During the debate in February 2018 that
surrounded the Nunes memo, which accused the FBI of abusing
its power while investigating Trump’s connections to Russia

30

See Ben Schreckinger, Inside Trump’s ‘Cyborg’ Twitter Army, POLITICO (Sept. 30,
2016, 5:06 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/donald-trump-twitterarmy-228923; see also Max de Haldevang, Russian Trolls and Bots Are Flooding Twitter
With Ford-Kavanaugh Disinformation, QUARTZ (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://qz.com/1409102/russian-trolls-and-bots-are-flooding-twitter-with-fordkavanaugh-disinformation/.
31
Bence Kollanyi, Philip N. Howard & Samuel C. Woolley, Bots and Automation Over
Twitter During the U.S. Election, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROJECT (Nov. 17,
2016), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/11/DataMemo-US-Election.pdf.
32
Khatya Chhor, As French Media Went Dark, Bots and Far-Right Activists Drove
#MacronLeaks, FRANCE 24 (May 9, 2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170508french-media-blackout-bots-far-right-activists-wikileaks-pushed-macronleaks.
33
Robert Gorwa & Douglas Guilbeault, Tinder Nightmares: The Promise and Peril of
Political Bots, WIRED (July 7, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/tinder-politicalbots-jeremy-corbyn-labour.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Shamsian, supra note 27 (quoting Jon Brady (@jonbradyphoto), TWITTER (June 8,
2017, 3:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/jonbradyphoto/status/872739582915342336?ref_src=twsrc%5E
tfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E872739582915342336&ref_url=htt
ps%3A%2F%2Fwww.thisisinsider.com%2Funited-kingdom-election-jeremy-corbyntinder-bot-labour-2017-6).
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during the 2016 United States election, thousands of bot-based
accounts
retweeted
messages
using
the
hashtag
#releasethememo.37 Many of the posts tagged specific members
of Congress, creating what could have easily appeared to be a
real, grassroots effort by the public to call for the memo to be
released. 38 In an eleven-day span, certain Republicans were
tagged in #releasethememo posts more than a half a million
times. 39 While the hashtag itself emerged organically, it was
quickly picked up by bot programmers and used to create a
unifying tool in certain partisans’ efforts to essentially create a
world using the machine, the very et de mundi machina discussed
earlier.40
In response to these bots, humans would have a tough
time contending with the deluge of regurgitation. When
congressional staffers attended to lawmakers’ social media
accounts, they were flooded with tens of thousands of messages
per day, most of them from non-human communicators, calling
for the memo’s release. 41 Conversely, it would be extremely
difficult for human publishers to communicate differing ideas
and to have them appear in any comparable quantity within such
a forum. Thus, the bots essentially flooded the marketplace with
their “product,” pushing out human discourse and creating an
alternate reality for those who viewed the messages in which
their constituents wanted the memo released.
Bots were similarly weaponized after the March 2017
Westminster Bridge attack in London. As Great Britain reeled
from the attack that killed five people and injured dozens more,
bot-based accounts began to circulate a picture of a woman in a
hijab who was walking by a crowd of people as they sought to
help an injured person. 42 The message read, “Muslim woman
pays no mind to the terror attack, casually walks by a dying man
. . . #PrayForLondon #Westminster #BanIslam.”43 Of course,
the words took the image out of context, a fact that news
organizations later established by speaking with the woman. 44
37

Molly K. McKew, How Twitter Bots and Trump Fans Made #ReleasetheMemo Go
Viral, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/04/trump-twitter-russiansrelease-the-memo-216935.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Hayley Dixon, Russian Bot Behind False Claim Muslim Woman Ignored Victims of
Westminster Terror Attack, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 13, 2017, 6:04 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/13/russian-bot-behind-false-claimmuslim-woman-ignored-victims/.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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The initial tweet regarding the image, which came from an
account called Texas Lone Star (@SouthLoneStar), was from a
Russian bot.45 The account had nearly 17,000 followers.46 White
nationalist Richard Spencer quickly retweeted and commented
on the image, using it to fuel his followers’ beliefs on social
media.47 His tweet was liked by nearly one-thousand others and,
as information flows in networked spaces, was almost certainly
shared across others’ self-constructed, personal networks. 48
Thus, in these instances, AI communicators were manipulated
by certain interests and used to flood the marketplace with ideas
that appeared to be conveyed by humans. The ideas moved
seamlessly into the information flows that take place within
virtual spaces and were received by many people, including those
in positions of power.
Broadly, these communicators, with their fundamentally
non-human natures, are often indistinguishable from human
speakers and capable of spreading misleading or false
information. By doing so, AI communicators can overwhelm the
marketplace with a single product or idea.
B. Content Sharers vs. Content Creators
The bots that were involved in the incidents discussed in
the preceding passages, while important in considering the future
of the marketplace, were relatively limited in their capabilities.
They are best classified as content movers or communicators.
These entities are more comparable to newspaper carriers than
content creators or speakers, who share more in common with
writers who craft messages.49 Other types of bot-based accounts,
however, are creating new content regarding matters of public
concern and thus coming much closer to resembling the
characteristics of human speakers. Every Trump-ette
(@everytrumpette), for example, was a Twitter-based bot that
was programmed to draw fifteen-second snippets from thencandidate Trump’s speeches and combine them with a picture of
the crowd from one of his rallies.50 As the audio clip plays, the
image focuses in on a single person in the crowd.51 The profile’s

45

Gianluca Mezzofiore, Troll Who Tweeted Fake Pic During Westminster Attack Is
Russian, MASHABLE (Nov. 14, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/11/14/troll-fakemuslim-picture-westminster-attack-russian-bot/#ktkwDMYRSPq0.
46
Dixon, supra note 42
47
Richard Spencer (@RichardBSpencer), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2017, 12:29 PM),
https://twitter.com/richardbspencer/status/844632152692043776?lang=en.
48
Id.
49
See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1506–12 (2013).
50
Every Trumpette (@everytrumpette), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/everytrumpette, (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
51
Id.
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description on Twitter reads: “looking into the eyes of every
trump [sic] fan.” 52 This AI content-creator is different in kind
from AI content-movers.
Similarly, other AI content-creators are a degree more
innovative. Erowid Sarah Palin (@SarowidPalinUSA) was
programmed to take parts of the former Alaska governor’s
political speeches and combine them with entries from Erowid
Experience Vaults, an online forum for people to describe what
happened to them when they were high. 53 The combinations
included “[o]ur government needs to begin to show the same
kind of range and adaptability as the mind on hallucinogens” and
“I wasn’t nervous but as the colors began to waver I realized that
everything was wrong. Crying. He isn’t going to make America
great again.” 54 Comedian Stephen Colbert worked with
programmers
to
create
Real
Human
Praise
(@RealHumanPraise), a bot that combines passages from movie
reviews on Rotten Tomatoes with Fox News program names
and personalities.55 It tweets every two minutes with messages
such as “Mike Huckabee skillfully guides the audience through
Huckabee’s fractured narrative, seeping his show in existential
dread,” and “[w]hen Sean Hannity’s Hannity arrived in 1985, it
set a benchmark in horror-comedy that few productions have
matched since.”56
In these instances, AI communicators were programmed
to draw information from constantly changing pools of data to
create content that reached thousands of followers. Thus, the
original programmer did not determine the content of the
messages, only the pools from which they were drawn and their
maximum length. The growing presence of content-creating AI
entities raises a variety of questions about the future of the
marketplace theory. In the preceding section’s examples, the
primary concern was that the non-human communicators were
effectively flooding the market with ideas, thus pushing out
actual human discourse, and as a result, creating a world or
conceptualization of the environment that would lead citizens to
believe public opinion regarding a matter of concern is
substantially different than it is in reality. The content-creating

52

Id.
See Erowid Sarah Palin (@SarowidPalinUSA), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/SarowidPalinUSA (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
54
Id. (Nov. 7, 2016, 7:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/SarowidPalinUSA/status/795837654344617984.
55
Dylan Stableford, Colbert Launches Twitter Bot to Praise Fox News, YAHOO NEWS
(Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/colbert-twitter-bot-fox-news-realhuman-praise- 173740903.html.
56
Real Human Praise (@RealHumanPraise), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/RealHumanPraise (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
53
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bots add another dimension to these concerns. The AI
communicators are more autonomous in the messages they
create and thus the nature of the ideas they contribute. When
considered individually, such a concern might seem slight.
When examined with the understanding that millions of these
entities are performing such actions, however, it becomes clear
the marketplace can easily be flooded by bot-based babble. These
millions of messages by non-human entities substantially
undermine the foundational assumptions of the marketplace
metaphor: generally rational people will in most instances be
capable of separating truth from falsity so long as the government
has only limited influence in the marketplace.57
C. Weak AI vs. Strong AI
Despite
these
advancements
in
non-human
communicators, fourth-wave iterations of these entities are
generally classified as forms of “weak AI.” 58 Scholars classify
weak AI as entities that can only recreate certain aspects of
human thought or activity online.59 The #releasethememo and
Westminster Bridge attack bots, for example, were capable of
sharing information throughout networked environments.
Erowid Sarah Palin and Real Human Praise added the capability
of creating content and making it available to others.60 Despite
these emergent capabilities, these weak AI tools are limited in
what they can accomplish, particularly regarding replicating
human behavior. Strong AI, on the other end of the spectrum,
represents entities that can exceed human capabilities and
interact in social situations as a person would. 61 While
corporations such as Microsoft and Google are working on
entities that can teach themselves through interacting with their
environments, strong AI technology, for now, generally remains
more of an idea than a reality.62
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The limitations of weak AI entities do not make them
easy to dismiss when considering the future of the marketplace
of ideas. Although it is difficult to identify all account holders as
human or non-human, such entities represent about 50 million,
or 15 percent of all of Twitter’s users. 63 The accounts are
triggered to tweet at certain times, retweet certain messages, or
to automatically respond to messages with certain key words or
hashtags. 64 Similarly, about 25 million of the more than 700
million Instagram users are bots.65 Bots on Instagram are often
used to make certain accounts more prominent, to give them
more legitimacy, or garner more interest online. 66 When
Instagram users buy bots to increase their presence, they are
essentially purchasing influence in the marketplace. The sharingbased bots can automatically like and spread everything a social
media user posts, thus broadcasting posts throughout virtual
spaces and increasing the apparent popularity of the messages
and, as a result, the impact of the account holder in the
network. 67 While such a process violates Instagram’s terms of
service agreement, these entities persist as difficult-to-pin-down
operators in these spaces.68 In short, the sheer volume of weak
AI created material skews the market’s supply of ideas toward
non-human communicators.
Relatedly, algorithms, computer programs that can sift
through and organize unprecedented amounts of data, are a form
of weak AI but they cannot be dismissed as unimportant
influencers in today’s marketplace of ideas. 69 Algorithms are
simply computer programs that provide step-by-step guidelines
for resolving complex problems.70 Search engines such as Google
use algorithms to sort through countless potential results to
present Internet users with the information they seek. 71 Of
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course, these algorithms do not simply gather all of the potential
responses. They include considerations such as the searcher’s
location, the site’s traffic numbers, and the user’s past searches
to organize the information.72 Similarly, Facebook’s news feed
algorithm decides which items, out of countless possibilities,
appear atop users’ apps and browsers when they use the social
media outlet.73 One study, which was conducted by Facebook
employees, explained that the social media giant’s algorithm
considers how often a viewer visits the site, which people and
groups they interact with, and which links they click on.74
Social media algorithms have unprecedented control over
how and what ideas are taken from the marketplace and
presented to people. Facebook’s algorithm, because of the way it
interprets users’ activities on the site, limits the range of political
ideas people encounter.75 Facebook’s algorithmic choices have
not gone unnoticed. 76 In 2016, Facebook was accused of
deliberately suppressing conservative information in its trending
topics section.77 A year later, during the massive women’s protest
marches that coincided with President Trump’s inauguration,
Facebook was criticized for limiting attention to the protests in
the same trending spaces.78 In 2018, the corporation shifted the
algorithm’s preferences to place greater emphasis on posts from
people with whom users are connected. 79 In each of these
instances, these algorithms, computer programs that can sift
through and organize unprecedented amounts of data, have
72
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substantial power to determine which ideas become prominent
and which ideas do not in the marketplace.80
These algorithms are different than bots in that they do
not actively communicate messages. Instead, they are limited to
acting as gatekeepers to the ideas individuals encounter. Since
private corporations maintain and hold these tools, their actual
instructions regarding how information is to be organized and
communicated remain unavailable to the public. Private
ownership of algorithms and the virtual spaces in which they
function has led to congressional hearings and garnered
substantial media attention regarding the power of corporations
to act as relatively arbitrary store managers within the
marketplace.81 These corporations can decide which ideas will
and will not be presented to individuals.82 Scholars have already
established that AI communicators can convey the biases of their
creators or limit ideas in their efforts to learn from their
interactions with individuals.83 Thus, while algorithms might be
considered one of the weakest forms of AI, they hold substantial
power to determine the ideas that enter the marketplace.
II. INTENTIONAL COMMUNITIES AND AI ACTORS
Human ideas can spread if the right environment exists;
non-human ideas are the same. Although the actions of
algorithms and AI communicators, particularly within political
discourse, are crucial to understanding the challenges the
marketplace approach faces in the networked era, the
environment in which these entities thrive must also be
considered.
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For more than half a century, AI communicators were
imprisoned in mainframes and on desktop computer hard drives.
The widespread adoption and development of the Internet was
their ticket to freedom.84 It was the development of the World
Wide Web, particularly since Web 2.0, which included the
emergence of social media sites, that such entities have found an
environment in which communication with people does not
require human form.85 Indeed, the lack of physical presence is
one of the crucial aspects of the shift to discourse in networked
spaces—for AI entities and human actors alike. As the famous
New Yorker cartoon explained at the beginning of the networked
communication revolution in 1993: “On the Internet, no one
knows you’re a dog.”86
This shift has influenced both how individuals represent
themselves and the types of information they encounter.
Additionally, the lack of a physical presence online allows AI
communicators to seamlessly interact with people and connects
them to the much larger innovation, which is the ability of
anyone with an Internet connection, anywhere in the world, to
form a community with distant others. In other words, online
communication made it so that time and space no longer limit
the ideas and individuals that a person can encounter every
day.87 Such a shift has substantial consequences for discourse in
democratic society, particularly regarding how individuals
understand themselves, others, and the information they
encounter. In shifting how individuals understand themselves
and others, as well as empowering people to limit the ideas they
encounter, the choice-rich online environment can substantially
distort the flow of the marketplace of ideas. Much as Amazon
creates personalized marketplaces when it tracks peoples’ buying
choices and searches and uses them to suggests future purchases,
in the networked era, individuals essentially create their own
marketplace of ideas. While convenient, both instances act to
limit the spectrum of ideas individuals encounter.
A. Networked Identities
AI communicators fit more seamlessly into the
marketplace of ideas and discourse in virtual spaces because
84
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human beings have already come to understand and represent
themselves differently in such forums. 88 The environments in
which people communicate have always influenced identity and
self-representation.89 The choice-rich, global, sharing-based, and
often anonymous nature of virtual spaces, however, has allowed
individuals to both intentionally construct carefully selected
identities and, less purposively, to adjust the type of discourse in
which they engage. Sociologist Manuel Castells emphasized that
the emergence of networked communication tools has essentially
rearranged the identity-forming influences in society.90 Castells
concluded: “[a]lthough each individual human mind constructs
its own meaning by interpreting the communicated materials on
its own terms, this mental processing is conditioned by the
communication environment.” 91 Thus, the shift from identity
forming interactions that were generally conducted in physical
environments to interactions that occur in virtual spaces with
unbounded geographical concerns has undermined locally and
regionally based influences on identity formation. 92 These
globally based identities challenge the assumption of locally
influenced communities of understanding.
Individuals now find solidarity and support for their
beliefs and ideas in virtual spaces, which do not include the same
socializing and shared-experience-building ingredients as
traditional influencing institutions in their physical
environments. In other words, networked spaces substantially
broaden the potential range of influences in their choice-rich
forums and allow individuals to limit their exposures to the types
of ideas they would normally encounter in physical spaces.93 For
example, a person in their physical environment might have
found their belief in an extreme political or religious view
unpopular and might have abandoned it. In networked spaces,
they can find others who have similar beliefs and thereby further
cultivate their otherwise unpopular understandings. 94 This
emerging solidarity among otherwise historically geographically
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isolated ideological groups can embolden individuals to act out
those beliefs where they live.95
The nature of virtual spaces is also influencing how
individuals understand themselves. People have always been
intentional about how they represent themselves to others.96 In
virtual spaces, however, individuals can manipulate their
identities by taking advantage of the lack of physical presence, a
factor that is also significant for AI communicators. People
generally represent themselves favorably online, highlighting
personal successes and ignoring failures and aspects of their
identities that they interpret as being potentially unpopular. 97
Such carefully curated representations are more possible today
because individuals generally act as gatekeepers to their identities
in virtual spaces, whereas in physical spaces, people cannot as
easily hide their negative behaviors, telling aspects of their
appearances, or failures. In short, there are no Instagram filters
for real life.
When individuals curate their online selves, they create
feedback loops where those behaviors that are most consistently
reinforced, via likes, shares, comments, and retweets, are
repeated and highlighted on social media, while those behaviors
that are not reinforced are ignored.98 As Sherry Turkle, a pioneer
in studying how networked tools influence human behavior,
explained, “you train yourself to post what will please.” 99
Cumulatively, when members of intentionally formed, interestbased communities online are repeating this process of selfrepresentation and reinforcement on a daily basis with others,
the virtual self can gradually become a relatively narrow, more
two-dimensional version of a person’s actual identity. Turkle
found that, as we build our online selves, “[w]e recreate
ourselves as online personae . . . . Our new media are well suited
for accomplishing the rudimentary. And because this is what
technology serves up, we reduce our expectations of each
other.”100 Those who program AI communicators have become
particularly adept at emulating such limited self-representation
patterns online. As a team of computer scientists explained,
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social bots can “infiltrate popular discussions, generating
topically interesting—and even potentially interesting—content,
by identifying relevant keywords and searching online for
information fitting that conversation.” 101 A curated online
identity, influenced by AI communicators, can distort a person’s
real identity and subsequent contributions to the marketplace of
ideas.
The types of messages and ideas individuals most often
communicate in virtual spaces further reinforce this more twodimensional nature of online identity and open the door to AI
entities. People have less control over whom they speak with
online.102 Certainly, individuals generally construct networks of
like-minded individuals online, but those networks, whether they
include hundreds, thousands, or more, often include different
constituencies. 103 Such constituencies can make fine–tuning a
tweet or post with the intent of reaching a particular group of
people difficult as the individual seeks to act out their online
identity. Furthermore, people are aware their messages can be
shared outside their immediate network, often without context
or with comments that can change the nature of the intended
message.104 Hence, as communication scholar Zizi Papacharissi
concluded, “[t]he individual must then engage in multiple mini
performances that combine a variety of semiological references
so as to produce a presentation of the self that makes sense to
multiple audiences.”105 As a result, online communicators tend
to limit the amount of subtlety and nuance people include in their
messages. Rather than the more surgical efforts made in physical
spaces with body language and other in-person social cues, they
produce simpler, more blunt messages online. Broadly, online
communication, by its nature, lends itself to being less personal
and more limited in depth. Such simplified, less nuanced
communication makes it easier for AI communicators to interact
with humans without their knowledge.
B. Networked Communities
Taken as a whole, rather than as a series of individual
identity and message decisions, the nature of human discourse
in virtual spaces encompasses a continuous flow of interactions
among individuals and ideas that are generally influenced by the
unique self-representation efforts and limitations inherent in
online discourse. When considered on a larger scale, the
101
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community level, these aspects of discourse in virtual spaces
become particularly important when it comes to understanding
the marketplace of ideas in the twenty-first century. In particular,
virtual communities, by their nature, are different from more
traditional communities in crucial ways.106 These differences are
substantially associated with the previous section’s concerns
regarding how individuals understand themselves and others in
virtual spaces.107 Network communication scholars classify the
relationships individuals share within social networks, in person
or online, in terms of strong and weak ties.108 A “tie” refers to
any type of relationship that exists “between communicators
wherever they exchange and share resources such as goods,
services, social support or information.” 109 People who share
enduring relationships exchange social capital by interacting
with and helping each other. Those who have weak ties with
others in their communities share limited social capital and are
therefore less likely to trust others or interact with them in
meaningful ways.110 Crucially, scholars have found individuals
do not establish the same types of bonds in virtual spaces as they
have historically formed in physical spaces.111
Political scientist Robert Putnam explained how the
nature of online tools changes how people interact.112 He found
people who play cards in person, for example, construct stronger
ties by talking before, during, and after the games.113 The social
capital that is generated during these in-person interactions is
more likely to lead to greater trust and a more meaningful
understanding among such individuals. 114 In card games in
virtual spaces, the talk is lost.115 People focus on winning because
the form of media generally limits the personal elements of the
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interaction.116 As in other instances, the nature of virtual forums
provides ample opportunities for AI communicators to
seamlessly join online communities and take part in discourse.
When a person plays cards online with strangers, it hardly
matters whether those unknown others are human or not. In fact,
very little of the experience humanizes the other players. Of
course, these concerns expand to interactions that are more
consequential than online card games. The relatively weak ties
that individuals share online make them less trustful of each
other and lead to consistent turnover in online communities as
lightly committed individuals disconnect and move on as their
interests wax and wane.117 In other words, virtual communities
are generally weakly tied communities.
While individuals generally share less meaningful bonds
with others in virtual spaces, the global, choice-rich online
environment has allowed people unprecedented selectivity
regarding whom they wish to engage with, which has led to
widespread, interest-based engagement. Thus, the often-weaker
bonds individuals share online does not limit engagement, it
merely changes its nature. Importantly, the result of the
combination between weaker ties and more choice has led to the
formation of a multiverse of marketplaces in which individuals
both intentionally and unconsciously limit the spectrums of ideas
and other citizens they engage with.118 Political scientists Shanto
Iyengar and Kyu Hahn found such a choice-rich environment
leads to citizen-constructed echo chambers where individuals
“limit their exposure to news or sources that they expect to find
agreeable. Over time, this behavior is likely to become
habituated so that users turn to their preferred sources
automatically no matter what the subject matter.”119
Of course, the creation of such intentional communities
raises significant concerns regarding the functionality of a
conceptual, shared marketplace. When individuals self-select the
information sources they interact with, the range of products, or
ideas, in the marketplace becomes limited. In other words,
fragmented communities can become relatively empty
storefronts, where only a few generally accepted ideas are
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considered. Legal scholar Cass Sunstein made such a concern
central to #Republic, in which he lamented the fading roles of the
“general interest intermediaries,” such as daily newspapers, and
of shared experiences that bind a society together. 120 Both of
these tools—the information sources that individuals once used
to construct a common baseline of understanding about the
world around them and the experiences that supported an idea
of nationhood—have in many ways become casualties of the
networked era.121
When individuals essentially construct their own
personal marketplaces of ideas, limiting the spectrum of
information and speakers they encounter, it becomes far easier
for AI communicators to spread false information. While the
Court has repeatedly expressed that protecting some false
expression can protect the marketplace, and therefore should be
safeguarded, echo chambers filled with belief-affirming
information that is false causes fundamental harm to the
assumptions that truth will rise and falsity will fail in the
marketplace of ideas. 122 Such a conclusion aligns with the
Court’s conclusion in Hustler v. Falwell. 123 In its opinion, the
Court emphasized, “false statements of fact are particularly
valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas.” 124 The nature of these self-made
marketplaces align with concerns raised by Iyengar and Hahn.
They concluded that when individuals turn their information
networks into echo chambers, they come to expect the
information to reinforce their existing understandings, rather
than allowing their beliefs to be challenged by new
information. 125 Thus, false information that aligns with the
accepted narratives within the intentional community is far more
likely to be accepted as truthful. For example, after seventeen
people were killed and dozens more were injured in a school
shooting in Florida in February 2018, AI communicators played
influential roles in the gun-rights-related discourse that
followed. 126 First, bots engaged with the existing hashtag,
120
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#Parklandshooting, spreading false information about the
shooting suspect’s interest in Islam and framing his work as that
of a “lone wolf” rather than a part of a larger problem regarding
gun violence in the United States.127 Second, the bots were used
to amplify extremist opinions that were created by human actors.
One account, @Education4Libs, tweeted that the shooter was a
registered Democrat and a member of Antifa.128 The account has
nearly 250,000 followers and researchers have identified it as one
of the accounts that bots most target by retweeting and
magnifying its messages as well as tweeting at it with similar
ideas. 129 Essentially, the human-run account does the work of
creating the messages and share bots simply spread it throughout
their connections across networked spaces. Thus, discourse in
these circumstances suffers both from the fragmented
communities that are more susceptible to the false and
misleading narratives that are spread by AI communicators and
the magnification of otherwise limited ideas facilitated by
sharing-focused bots. When a market of competing products is
overrun with an avalanche of counterfeits, the market has failed.
As Sunstein contended, when individuals communicate
only with like-minded others, as the choice-rich virtual spaces
allow, they can only become more extreme in their positions, not
less. 130 Furthermore, individuals’ decisions to limit the
expansiveness of their personal networks are not purely driven
by their desire to be surrounded by like-minded individuals. The
sheer size of virtual spaces, when considered without the
communities’ individuals construct, are too vast in terms of
information and choice for individuals to avoid certain
spectrum-limiting decisions. Thus, individuals must choose to
construct a network, ultimately providing a semblance of locality
to a space that lacks physical presence. In this regard, Castells
concluded individuals shrink “the size of the human experience
to a dimension that can be managed and defended by people
feeling lost in the whirlwind of a destructured world.”131 It is in
this effort to restructure a fragmented, choice-rich world that
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individuals limit the scope of the ideas they encounter and, at the
same time, AI communicators become particularly influential in
magnifying certain ideas, creating content, and engaging in
discourse with citizens.
C. Ownership
Finally, before focusing on the marketplace metaphor
itself, the nature of virtual spaces as forums for expression must
be considered. Networked spaces, while they in many ways
mimic the types of traditional public forums that for “time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,” are
privately controlled by the corporations that provide the
spaces.132 They are thus more comparable to a department store
than to a public park. 133 The owners welcome visitors to their
property, but if someone becomes disruptive or communicates
ideas that are unpopular, they will be removed. Search engines
and social media sites, the primary spaces in which AI
communicators function and where substantial amounts of
democratic discourse now occur, can be regulated by the whims
of those who own them.
While the owners of such spaces have generally professed
support for freedom of expression, 134 they continuously face
economic, political, and social pressures to limit expression in
ways that would violate traditional conceptualizations of the
First Amendment. 135 Twitter and Facebook, for example,
regularly block and shut down accounts.136 Facebook removed
Myanmar’s senior military leaders’ accounts in August 2018
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and, in October 2018, took down more shadowy accounts in
Myanmar that appeared to be entertainment-based, but were
actually run by the military.137 Of course, these actions were too
late to help the more than 700,000 Rohingya Muslims who were
forced from their homes after military attacks and ethnic
violence, which many attributed to a propaganda effort that
relied primarily on Facebook. 138 Twitter has worked with the
government to delete millions of accounts that are believed to be
associated with terrorist organizations. 139 The social media
company has also purged countless accounts that were believed
to be harmful political bots, a move which drew the ire of many
conservative leaders.140 Similarly, Instagram deleted millions of
harassing or spamming accounts in 2014.141 While the reasoning
behind deleting these accounts might be generally agreeable, the
companies’ decisions reinforce the fact that these spaces are
privately held and that traditional First Amendment barriers to
limiting speech are not present.142 Furthermore, the corporations
that own such spaces are not motivated by the necessity for
democratic discourse. Therefore, the emergence of virtual
marketplaces in networked spaces brings with it a change in the
general freedom of expression regime under which such
democratic discourse functions.
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III. THE MARKETPLACE THEORY AND ITS PROBLEMS
Scholars have associated the marketplace approach with
foundational assumptions that are based in Enlightenment-era
understandings regarding truth, the rationality of individuals,
and the role of citizens in democratic society.143 Importantly, this
theoretical framework was not explicitly provided in Justice
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams. 144 Furthermore, though justices
have consistently turned to the metaphor to communicate how
they understand freedom of expression, they have never
explicitly defined it. 145 Instead, as time passed after Justice
Holmes’s initial use of the metaphor in 1919, and as justices
turned to it in constructing their reasoning on nearly every type
of First Amendment question—including defamation, 146
privacy, 147 commercial speech, 148 broadcast regulation, 149 and
online 150 and corporate speech cases 151 —these Enlightenmentbased assumptions came to be understood as the foundational
underpinnings of the theory.
Such a marriage between Enlightenment thought and the
ideas Justice Holmes introduced in his dissent in Abrams bears
substantial historical and theoretical support. First, the
marketplace approach overlaps significantly with Milton’s
seventeenth-century conceptualization of the competition
between truth and falsity. He posited, for example, that “Truth
be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”152
Also, Justice Holmes wrote to a friend that he re-read John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty in late February 1919, several months before the
143
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Court heard the Abrams appeal that October. 153 Historian J.
Salwyn Schapiro contended Justice Holmes drew from Mill’s
work in his opinion for the Court in Schenck v. United States,154
which was announced in March 1919. 155 Schapiro also
associated the marketplace metaphor with Mill’s philosophy,
contending the thinker did not believe freedom of expression was
a natural right, but rather a necessity for rational individuals who
sought to govern themselves. 156 Thus, the marketplace theory
came to be associated with the notion that truth is generally
objective and universal and that, in an environment in which the
government does not significantly interfere with the flow of
ideas, rational, free individuals are capable of identifying truth
and rejecting falsehood.
Since Justice Holmes’s time on the Court, Justices have,
whether they intended to do so or not, generally associated such
Enlightenment-founded assumptions with their uses of the
marketplace theory. 157 The Court rationalized its unanimous
decision in Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 158 for example, by
stating “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition
of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”159 The Court
quoted and cited Justice Holmes’s marketplace-of-ideas-based
reasoning a few sentences afterward. 160 Later in the decision,
Chief Justice John Rehnquist reasoned “it is a central tenet of
the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral
in the marketplace of ideas.” 161 Similarly, in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission in 1969,
Justice Byron White explained that “[i]t is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”162 Two years
later, in Cohen v. California, the Court reasoned when the
government restricts ideas based on the merits of their content, it
takes away the ability of citizens and society more broadly to
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decide what is true and best for society.163 Justice John Harlan
wrote that free expression was designed with the “hope that use
of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry
and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests.” 164 In each of these
examples, the justices leaned upon assumptions about a
generally objective, universal nature of truth and the rationality
of citizens in constructing their rationales. Similarly, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., three years after Cohen, Justice Louis Powell
constructed his reasoning for the Court’s opinion upon these
assumptions, concluding that “[h]owever pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”165
Finally, in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s detailed dissent in
Central Hudson & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, he explicitly associated the marketplace theory with
Enlightenment thought, citing Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,
Milton’s Areopagitica, Mill’s On Liberty, and Justice Holmes’s
dissent in Abrams.166 Having intertwined the marketplace theory
with Enlightenment thinkers and their works, he concluded
“[w]hile it is true that an important objective of the First
Amendment is to foster the free flow of information,
identification of speech that falls within its protection is not aided
by the metaphorical reference to a ‘marketplace of ideas.’” 167
Thus, though the Chief Justice ultimately questioned the validity
of the marketplace approach in deciding whether the First
Amendment should protect commercial speech, he clearly
intertwined it with Enlightenment thought. Each of the
preceding examples helps to communicate ways that Supreme
Court justices have used the marketplace approach to
communicate their understandings regarding the First
Amendment. More importantly, however, these cases highlight
that the fundamental, Enlightenment-oriented assumptions
about truth and the rationality of individuals in democratic
society have come to be conceptualized as being synonymous
with the marketplace theory.
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A. Scholarly Dissents
While Chief Justice Rehnquist critiqued the marketplace
theory in his dissent in Central Hudson, the Court has generally
employed the marketplace approach sans critical questions about
its assumptions. 168 Communication law scholar W. Wat
Hopkins concluded justices have historically “accepted without
question that the metaphor is effective because [of] the rationale
upon which it is built . . . .”169 Unlike the majority of the justices
who have served on the Court since Justice Holmes, legal
scholars have raised substantial concerns regarding the theory’s
assumptions. 170 Such concerns are particularly important in
examining how the marketplace theory can or should function
in the era of AI communicators. In particular, scholars have
attacked the theory’s assumptions about the nature of truth and
the rationality of individuals. 171 Scholars have also questioned
how information flows and reaches citizens. Legal scholar C.
Edwin Baker concluded broadly the theory’s rationale is “not
persuasive” and that it is “unworkable, dangerous, and
inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the purpose of
the first amendment.”172
Scholars have paid particular attention to the approach’s
assumptions regarding the nature of truth. Put simply, they have
concluded truth is subjective and self-created rather than
objective and universal. 173 Such a conclusion substantially
undermines one of the bulwarks of the marketplace approach. As
legal scholar Stanley Ingber reasoned, “[i]f truth is to defeat
falsity through robust debate in the marketplace . . . truth must
be an objective rather than a subjective, chosen subject.” 174 If
truth is not objective, Ingber concluded, the marketplace theory
fails. 175 In contrast, legal scholar Frederick Schauer came to a
similar conclusion regarding the nature of truth, but added that
replacing such an assumption with a subjective approach to truth
does not necessarily harm the theory itself.176 He explained “[i]f
we reject the possibility of attaining objective knowledge, and
reject as unsatisfactory any method of discovering truth, defining
168
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truth as a process rather than a standard becomes compelling.”177
Such an approach aligns with more discourse-based theories of
how knowledge and truth emerge through interactions among
individuals in democratic society.178 Baker held less hope for the
theory. He bluntly concluded “truth is not objective.” 179 He
explained that if truth is objective, if there is a shared reality that
would lead to citizens accepting truth and rejecting falsehood,
then the theory could potentially function. 180 If truth is
subjective, however, the theory must account for “why and how
the usually unequal advocacy of various viewpoints leads to the
‘best choice.’”181
Baker’s concern regarding the unequal nature of the
marketplace represents another reoccurring concern regarding
the theory. Most famously, legal scholar Jerome Barron
contended the marketplace theory was “romantic” and “if ever
there were a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has long
ceased to exist.” 182 Barron concluded the marketplace fails to
account for the fact that not everyone has equal access to the
marketplace.183 Individuals are not necessarily able to get their
ideas into the crowded information marketplace. 184 Similarly,
not all messages receive the same amount of attention. Some
communicators have the tools necessary to broadly
communicate their messages or to package them in a way that
makes them more interesting to citizens. Baker noted that
traditional media outlets give greater attention to “dominant
groups’ interests and reflects their view of reality.”185 Soon, the
dominant group in the marketplace could become AI entities.
Finally, in a related sense, scholars have questioned the
assumption that individuals are generally rational and, in most
cases, capable of discerning truth from falsity. As individuals
encounter some ideas and not others and they encounter some
ideas at higher and more intensive frequencies than others, it is
difficult to imagine a certain, shared truth will win out in the
marketplace. Scholars have also found that repeated exposure to
ideas, even if an individual initially rejected the ideas as false,
177
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can lead to eventual acceptance or, in the least, attitude change
about the ideas. 186 Furthermore, Ingber posited that citizens’
varying socioeconomic statuses, personal experiences, and roles
in society will very likely influence the way in which they come
to determine what is true and false among the ideas they
encounter. 187 Furthermore, in a diverse society, citizens are
unlikely to accept ideas as truthful, no matter how strongly
founded in rationality, if the ideas run counter to their personal
or communal beliefs, interests, or biases. 188 Such a concern is
particularly relevant in an era when individuals construct idea
and interest-based communities, while limiting their exposure to
opposing ideas in virtual spaces.
B. Justice Holmes and Pragmatic Truth
Before examining the existing legal precedents that relate
to freedom of expression rights and AI communicators, it is
important to consider Justice Holmes’s legal and scholarly
writings, as well as his voluminous personal correspondence. His
extensive writings highlight that, despite introducing the
marketplace theory, which would ultimately be undergirded by
Enlightenment-era assumptions regarding truth and the
rationality of individuals, he did not believe in absolute truth.189
In fact, Justice Holmes quite explicitly expressed in many
instances he did not believe truth was objective and universal.190
In a 1929 letter to his friend Harold Laski, a British economist,
he characterized truth as “the system of my intellectual
limitations.”191 In the same letter, he concluded “absolute truth
is a mirage.”192 Similarly, seventeen years earlier, as part of an
extensive interaction with his friend Patrick Sheehan, an Irish
Catholic priest, Justice Holmes explained:
[A] general fact rather is to be
regarded
like
a
physical
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phenomenon—accepted like any
other phenomenon so far as it
exists—to be combated or got
around so far as may be, if one does
not like it, as soon as fully possible.
I always say yes—whatever is, is
right—but not necessarily will be
for thirty seconds longer.193
In both instances, Justice Holmes communicated an
understanding that truth is dependent upon the availability of
information, which can be different from person to person.
In “Natural Law,” which appeared in Harvard Law Review
in 1918, just a year before he authored the Court’s opinion in
Schenck v. United States and penned the dissent in which he
introduced the marketplace approach in Abrams, Holmes wrote
“we all, whether we know it or not, are fighting to make the kind
of world that we should like—but that we have learned to
recognize that others will fight and die to make a different world,
with equal sincerity or belief.” 194 He continued, “when
differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other
man rather than let him have his way. But that is perfectly
consistent with admitting that, so far as it appears, his grounds
are just as good as ours.”195 In these passages, as is the case in
many of the Justice’s writings, he included war imagery to
communicate his point. Justice Holmes contended that his
experience fighting in the Civil War, in which he was shot three
different times, changed his life. 196 In his personal
correspondences with friends, he in many ways blamed the
outbreak of the war on the rigid positions the North and South
held regarding their differences.197 In short, the war made him far
more skeptical of any person’s claim that they possessed absolute
truth. To Justice Holmes, truth was a process. Therefore, if a
person claimed to have obtained absolute truth, that simply
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meant they had decided to hold fast to their own personal
prejudices and biases rather than to evolve as new experiences
and information became available. These themes can also be
found in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams, where he concluded
that “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas.”198
Ultimately, late in his life, Justice Holmes described his
understanding of truth by identifying himself as a
“bettabilitarian.”199 He explained that, since he did not believe in
absolute certainty, the best he or any other person could do is bet
on what is true, using past experiences and the information
available. 200 Such a conceptualization of truth is primarily
process-based, noting that individuals make conclusions based
upon their experiences and the information they have available
and that these “truths” can evolve as time goes on. Justice
Holmes’s bettabilitarian approach is not substantially different
from his conclusion in The Common Law in 1881, far earlier in his
career, when he explained that the “life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience.”201 Importantly, Justice Holmes’s
dissent in Abrams included substantial references to the
bettabilitarian approach. He concluded “all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”202 Thus, the
author who introduced the marketplace concept into the
Supreme Court’s vocabulary conceptualized truth as something
that evolves based on experience and available information,
making it different for each person. Therefore, while the
marketplace approach, as outlined in Abrams, does not include
any citations regarding Justice Holmes’s influences in
constructing it, he surrounded it with themes that, when placed
in context with his other writings, represented how he
conceptualized truth.
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IV. AI SPEECH RIGHTS: FROM CORPORATIONS TO CATS
AI entities present a challenge to Justice Holmes’s
marketplace theory and his conceptualization of truth. The
Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed First Amendment
rights as they might apply to AI communicators. State and
federal courts have made only limited references to such
concerns. 203 Perhaps two of the most relevant cases so far
regarding the rights of AI communicators and their place in
democratic discourse dealt with the Google search engine’s
algorithm-based outputs. In Search King v. Google, a 2003 federal
district court case from Oklahoma, an online advertising firm
sued Google after its placement in the company’s “PageRank”
system suddenly dropped. 204 The advertising firm sued for an
injunction against Google, as well as damages, contending the
company maliciously adjusted its algorithms so it would not
appear as prominently in searches.205 Google argued the search
results its algorithms produce are essentially opinions, which are
protected by the First Amendment. 206 Despite Search King’s
contention that algorithms, since they are based on computer
programs, are not capable of producing subjective results, the
Court sided with Google. The judge reasoned while the
algorithm “is objective in nature[,] . . . the result, which is the
PageRank—or the numerical representation of relative
significance of a particular web site—is fundamentally subjective
in nature.”207 The court compared PageRanks with the ratings
that financial lenders such as Moody’s publish, explaining that
these ratings are based on complex formulas, but are, in the end,
a representation of the lender’s opinion. 208 Thus, the First
Amendment protected the algorithmic outputs because they
represented the company’s opinion.
Four years later, in another district court, an online
publisher sued Google for refusing to allow advertising for his
websites and for removing the sites from the search results that
its algorithm produced for users.209 Google contended it would
violate its First Amendment rights for the government to compel
it to “speak” by forcing it to publish information. The judge
agreed with Google, concluding the First Amendment provides
203
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individuals the right to decide what “to say and what not to
say.”210
While both cases raised questions about algorithms and
their power to influence what individuals see and do not see
when seeking information online, the judges did little to address
the extent to which First Amendment protections might be
extended
to
computer-program-based,
non-human
communicators. Instead, the judges in both cases firmly
associated the algorithmic outputs with the corporation’s speech.
In other words, the AI communicators, which were the relatively
weak AI found in algorithms, were not addressed as independent
communicators, thus little light was shed on how judges might
understand their rights in the future. In the absence of AI-specific
rulings, we must turn to two other areas in which the Courts have
made clear rulings regarding the rights of non-human
communicators—animals and corporations.
A. Blackie the Cat Says “I Love You”
Animals, with the help of owners and activists, have
raised many legal challenges that have required courts to
determine the extent to which non-human actors can claim
protections that have historically been purely associated with
humans. Of course, while animals are a type of non-human actor
that the courts have considered in terms of human rights, they do
not pose the same challenges to the foundational assumptions of
the marketplace of ideas theory as AI entities. However, the
cases in which they have claimed human-like rights—or at least
lawyers and activist groups have on their behalf—have
challenged judges to articulate rationales regarding the extent to
which non-human actors should and should not receive human
rights. In the most relevant case, Miles v. City Council of Augusta,
the owners of Blackie the Cat contended that being compelled to
purchase a business license in order to collect donations from
their pet’s performances violated both theirs and the cat’s First
Amendment rights.211 Blackie the Cat was capable of saying “I
love you” and “I want my Mama” on command. 212 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the owners’ First Amendment claim
and, in a footnote in the final lines of the case, scoffed at
extending First Amendment rights to a cat.213 The court wrote it
would “not hear a claim that Blackie’s right to free speech has
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been infringed.” 214 The court continued, “although Blackie
arguably possesses a very unusual ability, he cannot be
considered a ‘person’ and is therefore not protected by the Bill of
Rights.”215
Other animal-related cases have resulted in similar
conclusions by courts. Animals, as non-human actors, have
generally been found to lack standing because they lack
personhood and therefore cannot succeed in their claims. Most
recently this reasoning was a part of a federal district court’s
decision in the “monkey selfie” case in 2016.216 Naruto, a sixyear-old crested macaque, took pictures of himself using a
camera that David John Slater had left unattended.217 Slater used
the photos, which led PETA and other animal rights groups to
claim he had violated Naruto’s copyright. The judge concluded
the Copyright Act was only intended to apply to humans.218 The
judge cited Cetacean Community v. Bush, one of two other recent
cases that involved animal rights questions, in constructing his
reasoning. 219 In Naruto, as well as in Tilikum v. Sea World, the
federal courts reasoned the animals simply lacked standing.220
Importantly, in Tilikum, the Court concluded that killer whales
could not succeed in a Thirteenth Amendment-based suit against
Sea World—which argued that keeping the whales in
confinement constituted slavery—because they were not
human. 221 The court reasoned the amendment “applies to
humans, and not orcas.”222 In Cetacean, the court emphasized if
Congress wished to extend existing or future laws to animals, it
could do so, but no such wording, or evidence of intent regarding
the inclusion of animals, was present in the relevant laws
involved in the case.223 Thus, courts have consistently rejected
claims made on the behalf of animals, which represent a type of
non-human actor. These decisions, however clear they appear to
be regarding the rights of non-human actors and how applicable
they may seem regarding the rights of potential claims made by
AI communicators, do not represent the only set of court
decisions in this area.
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B. The Corporate Speech Argument
Though fundamentally different than Blackie the Cat in
nearly every way, corporations and the talking cat share one
crucial aspect in common—they are both non-human
communicators. Importantly, where Blackie the Cat, or at least
his owners, failed to succeed in claiming First Amendment
protections, corporations have succeeded. The reasons for their
success are crucial to the central question of this Article.
Beginning in the 1970s, first with Buckley v. Valeo and then with
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti two years later, the Supreme
Court concluded that the First Amendment protects corporate
speech. 224 In Bellotti, corporations challenged a Massachusetts
law that limited their ability to communicate ideas about a ballot
initiative that would have affected them and their interests. 225
Importantly, the Court reasoned in the case that the identity of
the speaker should not matter in First Amendment cases. Calling
upon its reasoning from Mills v. Alabama in 1966, the Court
explained that “a major purpose of the First Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”226 Following
this line of logic, Justice Louis Powell, in writing for the Court,
concluded that “[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no
one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed
speech.” 227 Finally, and crucially, he highlighted that “[t]he
inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source.”228
The Court’s decision in Bellotti overturned the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s ruling in the case from the year
before. The Massachusetts court had substantially based its
conclusions upon its analysis of the nature of corporations and
whether or not they should have rights that are afforded to
human citizens. In referring to Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
concluded that corporations were not protected by the First
Amendment because, much as was the case in the animal-related
decisions, they were not citizens. 229 The Massachusetts court
drew from a 1906 Supreme Court ruling, which concluded the
Fourteenth Amendment only extends to “the liberty of natural,
224
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not artificial, persons.”230 Thus, the Supreme Court had this line
of reasoning from Massachusetts’s highest court in front of it
when it considered the appeal, but chose to go a different
direction, ultimately concluding that the First Amendment
protected corporations.
The Court reaffirmed this approach in 2010 in its decision
in Citizens United. Importantly, Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for the Court, emphasized that “[o]n certain topics
corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the
best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts,
including the speech of candidates and elected officials.”231 The
Court reasoned that, therefore, not only should corporations
have a right to speak because political matters might affect their
interests, as was the focus of the Court’s justification in Bellotti,
but corporations are uniquely qualified to contribute to discourse
in democratic society more generally. Chief Justice John
Roberts, in a concurring opinion in Citizens United, emphasized
that the First Amendment was “written in terms of ‘speech,’ not
speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of
speaker.”232 Thus, the Court in these corporate-speech decisions
communicated that an artificial entity that can contribute to
discourse in democratic society should be protected by the First
Amendment.
C. Reconciling Corporate Speech Rights with Blackie the Cat’s Failure
in Court
The animal rights and corporate speech cases appear, on
the surface, to represent two separate lines of thought regarding
the extent to which First Amendment rights should be extended
to AI communicators. The natures of the two different types of
non-human actors in these cases, however, highlight important
aspects of this Article’s larger questions regarding the future of
the marketplace approach. If First Amendment protections are
extended to AI communicators, then one effect will be that the
spectrum of potential solutions for safeguarding the marketplace
becomes substantially narrower. Therefore, the differences
between the corporate speech and animal-related cases
contribute important building blocks to this Article’s central
question.
The first important difference between the lines of rulings
is that corporations are collections of citizens. While they are
“artificial legal entities,” each member of the corporation is
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human, and humans are protected by the First Amendment. This
observation aligns with the Supreme Court’s reasoning from
Bellotti and Citizens United, where justices emphasized that
corporations can contribute to discourse. Animals, however,
generally lack the ability to contribute to discourse and are
therefore not protected by the First Amendment.233
Second, and in a related sense, the nature of the
messengers and their potential intents in communicating are
different than the animal and corporation cases. Blackie the Cat
was not actually expressing a meaningful message when he made
noises that sounded like “I love you.” 234 The cat was merely
executing an action it was trained to perform when prompted.
Similarly, Naruto the monkey unlikely intended to express
himself when he took a picture using the photographer’s
camera. 235 As the judge explained, Naruto had seen many
tourists and photographers operate cameras and was merely
reenacting those behaviors. 236 Conversely, corporations, as
collections of individuals, can consider a variety of factors when
constructing messages. Corporations, via those who work for
them, select and create messages that are conveyed with specific
purposes. Thus, as legal scholar Tim Wu highlighted, a
distinction can be drawn between AI actors that communicate and
those that speak. 237 Wu explained “[t]hose who merely carry
information from place to place (courier services) generally don’t
enjoy First Amendment protection, while those who select a
distinct repertoire, like a newspaper . . . do.”238 Blackie the Cat
and Naruto, much like many forms of Weak AI, were certainly
communicating, but they were not speaking in the sense that they
intended to contribute ideas to the marketplace.
It is therefore reasonable that the question of First
Amendment rights for AI communicators could come down to
the nature of the communicator. If the entity merely provides
information or automatically shares content, such as an
algorithm or a bot that retweets every message a human account
holder publishes, then it can be classified as more of a
communicator than a speaker and should therefore not receive
First Amendment protections. Conversely, if an AI entity is
constructing original messages that contribute to democratic
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discourse, the Supreme Court’s reasoning from the corporatespeech cases strongly support the conclusion that they should be
protected. Justice Powell in his opinion in Bellotti and Chief
Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion in Citizens United both
emphasized that the First Amendment should focus on the
speech and not the speaker, and it is clear that some AI
communicators can contribute to discourse with their
messages.239
V. TOWARD A PROCESS-FOCUSED MARKETPLACE
The marketplace of ideas, while it has persisted as the
Supreme Court’s dominant rationale for freedom of expression
for nearly a hundred years, faces new challenges in the twentyfirst century. In addition to longstanding questions about the
very foundational assumptions with which it has come to be
associated, primarily those regarding the nature of truth and the
rationality of citizens, the theory now faces substantial concerns
about how it can function in an era when individuals—human
actors—are often forming substantially fragmented communities
of like-minded individuals and, at the same time, hordes of AI
communicators are moving within these virtual communities,
spreading false information and drowning out the exchanges of
ideas that are taking place among citizens by overwhelming the
forums with ideological messages.
In other words, networked technologies have allowed
citizens to create a vast multiverse of relatively limited
marketplaces that offer few ideas and even fewer challenges to
the agreed upon “truths.” It is within these limited marketplaces
that AI communicators are entering discourse with citizens and
are finding substantial power to spread falsity and
misinformation that reinforces pre-existing narratives. Beyond
simply sharing untrue information, weak AI entities are being
used to overwhelm these marketplaces with certain ideas and, in
doing so, are drowning out other voices and ideas. This process
was evident in the discourse that surrounded the Nunes Memo
as bots were employed to take up the organically created
#releasethememo hashtag and flood politicians’ Twitter feeds
with a certain idea. 240 Ultimately, the fundamentally inhuman
nature of the AI communicators—the amount of data they can
process and the speed at which they operate—allows them to fill
the marketplaces with only their product. If other ideas were

239

See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see also Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392–93 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
240
See supra Section I.A.

61

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

expressed, few, if anyone, could find their “product” amongst
the crowded shelves of ideas that were expressed by the AI
entities and the people who programmed them.
Thus, as indicated earlier, while it is unlikely we face the
dilemma that comes from creating a “god from the machine,”
deus ex machina, the capability that AI communicators have to
essentially create our world, et de mundi machina, by influencing
the ideas and information we encounter as individuals immerse
themselves in discourse in virtual spaces, requires a careful look
at the foundational assumptions of the marketplace of ideas.
Considering these concerns, this Article has questioned how the
marketplace approach can remain a dominant justification for
freedom of expression, as well as a workable model for how the
process of a free exchange of ideas functions, as the Fourth Wave
of networked technology nears.
A. The Process-Based Marketplace
Ultimately, this Article proposes that two important steps
must be taken. First, we must revise the foundational
marketplace assumption that truth is generally universal and
absolute and replace it with a more process-based approach.
Such a revision allows for the theory to focus on being a
justification for protecting the process through which citizens
come to understand the world around them and, ultimately,
govern themselves. In practice, this approach means that, rather
than finding that freedom of expression was created to protect
the ability of the truth to be discovered or to vanquish falsities,
as the traditional marketplace approach has been understood, the
process-based approach emphasizes that the First Amendment
safeguards the process through which individuals come to their
understandings. This approach can also be reconciled with
recent speech cases regarding corporations and animals. Thus,
when the courts face a First Amendment question, their concern
should not be as much upon the outcome—the truth winning out
amidst falsities—as the process that leads to understanding. This
approach aligns more closely with Justice Holmes’s more
pragmatic conceptualizations of how truth functions and, most
importantly, situates the theory in a way that more adequately
explains how free expression functions in the networked era.241
This process-based approach opens the door to the second
important change. When protecting the process of information
discovery and truth formation, information becomes a public
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good, something that has a certain inherent value. 242 Such a
realization is crucial. When the objective truth requirement is
removed from the marketplace’s foundational assumptions, the
idea that truth will always win when it “grapples,” as Milton
contends, becomes less salient as a justification for protecting the
exchange of ideas. Thus, we no longer need to protect the ideas,
so truth and falsity can battle. Instead, the exchange of ideas
must be protected because truth is a process. If truth is a process,
then the provision of truth becomes a public good, something that
is justified by its contribution to the marketplace of ideas.
B. Reclaiming the Marketplace
The combination of the process-based understanding of
truth and the public-good assumption that goes along with it
provides the necessary building blocks for constructing a
justification for safeguarding the marketplace in the era of AI
communicators. The courts have generally rejected First
Amendment and other claims by non-human entities in which
the communicator merely repeated information, rather than
creating and expressing ideas. Conversely, the Supreme Court
has constructed a relatively strong precedential foundation for
protecting the rights of non-human communicators that do
convey ideas, particularly if those ideas hold the potential to be
a public good that can contribute to the process of truth discovery.243
This dichotomy was seen in the animal-related cases, where
Blackie the Cat and Naruto the Monkey, despite executing
communicative acts, failed to receive protection for their
expression. 244 Conversely, the Supreme Court contended
corporate speech should be protected because these artificial
entities can contribute important ideas to discourse. 245 Justice
Kennedy in his opinion in Citizens United emphasized that “[t]he
Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently
under the First Amendment simply because such associations
are not ‘natural persons.’”246
If these understandings are applied to AI communicators,
the process-based, public-good model would allow for some

242

Jared Schroeder, The Holmes Truth: Toward a Pragmatic, Holmes-Influenced
Conceptualization of the Nature of Truth, 3 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 169, 195–97
(2018).
243
See supra Sections IV.A–B.
244
Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016), aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018); Miles v. Augusta, 710
F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir. 1983).
245
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 777 (1978)
246
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343.

63

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

regulation of those entities that merely repeat information but
would protect those that construct and convey innovative ideas.
The line between these two types of entities is, admittedly, not
completely clear. The courts, however, could incorporate the
originality test that was constructed in Feist v. Rural Telephone. In
that case, the Supreme Court concluded that for a work to be
protected under the Copyright Act, it must have a modicum of
creativity.247 Using similar logic, in order for AI-based messages
to be protected, the courts could require such works include a
certain amount of originality. Thus, bots that draw from existing
pools of information to create new posts, such as Every
Trumpette (@everytrumpette), would be protected while bots
that simply automatically retweet other tweets would not.
Importantly, the original messages that are being shared,
whether humans or AI entities publish them, would be protected
under this approach. The retweeted or otherwise shared
messages that are conveyed by AI entities, however, could be
regulated, since they are simply communicating rather than
speaking.
Similarly, this approach would allow some regulation of
AI communicators that spread false and misleading information
rather than factual information.248 Certainly, in many cases, such
expression, if communicated by a human, would be protected
unless it was defamatory or ventured into another area of already
unprotected speech.249 The courts, however, have not indicated
that non-human communicators have the same rights as humans.
The animal rights and corporate-speech cases conveyed the
understanding that non-human actors only receive First
Amendment protections if their expression contributes to
discourse and is, thus, a public good. For this reason, it makes
sense some regulation that purely halts intentionally false
information that is communicated by AI entities would not
violate the First Amendment under this conceptualization of the
marketplace approach. In particular, messages that merely
repeat misinformation could be regulated, since there is no
originality and since they lack the public good of contributing to
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the truth-discovery process. While a challenging, difficult area to
regulate, careful work in these areas could help address the
spread of intentionally false information within fragmented,
echo-chamber-dominated virtual communities without limiting
First Amendment protections.
More conceptually, the proposed revisions to the
marketplace metaphor would provide the courts with a
justification for freedom of expression that would guide them in
such cases. Identifying this dividing line, while difficult to draw,
would provide a path to eliminate the problem that arises when
AI communicators, by their fundamentally non-human natures,
flood the marketplace with countless thousands of messages,
whether they are truthful or false, thus eliminating the ability for
other ideas to be heard and creating the potential perception that
one idea is more accepted or popular than others. At the same
time, this approach avoids the First Amendment problems that
would arise if the government sought to eliminate all AI-based
communicators.
Without these revisions to the foundations of the
marketplace approach, the theory will fail to remain relevant in
the twenty-first century. AI communicators are, by their natures,
fundamentally different than the human actors that were on the
minds of the theory’s authors and the justices that have employed
it during the past one hundred years. The process and public
good revisions to the marketplace theory provide slight
adjustments to how expression is justified. By focusing on
protecting a process that leads to truth formation, the approach
retains a strong foundational interest in protecting freedom of
expression, but at the same time is clarified in a way allows for
limited constraints on AI communicators that do not contribute
to creating a marketplace that is focused upon protecting the
development of truth for each citizen. If truth is a process, then
that process must be protected.

